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LECTURE

The Litigation Process in the
Development of Environmental Law
BY DAVID SIVE*

It is difficult for me to think of any honor ever conferred
upon me that is greater than the honor here today inaugurating a lecture series marking the contributions of Lloyd Garrison to the movement and body of environmental law, of which
this law school is now one of the nation's acknowledged leaders. That is so whether I start with my being named the most
courteous boy in the 1939 graduating class of James Madison
High School in Brooklyn, or proceed to the two Purple Hearts
I received for being wounded in World War II (on both occasions of which, I confess, my back faced the enemy) or then go
to any of the professional items which have been cited in an
introduction.
The reasons for my sentimentalism include purely personal recollections of Lloyd Garrison, as well as those begin* This is the annotated form of the First Annual Lloyd K Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law at the Pace University School of Law. The author
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the research and proofreading by Alexandra Shultz, an editor of the School's Environmental Law Review, and of the
help, by way of ideas and comments, of his partners, David Paget and Daniel
Riesel.
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ning close to thirty years ago of Richard Ottinger and
Nicholas Robinson. 1 I recall of Lloyd:
A. His heartening appearances at Scenic Hudson Board
meetings, some held in my office, when preparing the Scenic
Hudson appeal; 2 at one time he presented his new assistant,
Al Butzel, with a 1960s wild hair look, who at first frightened
me some, in the presence of some fairly conservative board
members such as Carl Carmer;
B. Lloyd accompanying Steve Duggan, Brooks Atkinson, Al Butzel, and myself on a windy, frigid wintery day,
walking out on little Stony Point to sense the awe of Storm
King Mountain, in preparation for Atkinson's expert testimony at the second round of Federal Power Commission
(FPC) hearings; and
C. My meetings with Lloyd, about three to four times
each year for a number of years, he going south along Park
Avenue to his office and I going north to mine; at some of the
meetings I felt called upon to tell him that I had been given
credit for his 1965 victory and that I had always tried hard to
prevent that, whereupon he would graciously assure me that
my misgivings were unfounded.
The earliest activities with Dick [Ottinger] included an
early 1960s walk along the West Bank of our great River, at
the foot of Hook Mountain, led by Justice William Douglas,
whom my wife Mary suggested inviting to lead us, with about
forty others including David Brower, Tom Hoving, Jr., Mary,
and our children. One of my early activities with Nick
[Robinson] was a joint appearance for a few minutes on the
Today Show, to examine the glamour of environmental law
and lawyers, for which we both had to be in the Rockefeller
Center studios at 4:30 A.M. to have our faces painted.
Well, all of the foregoing is really part of the sentimental
side of this appearance before you, whereas the honor conferred upon me does require me to say more meaningful
1. Richard Ottinger is the current Dean of Pace University School of Law
and a former Congressman from Westchester County. Nicholas Robinson is a
professor of environmental law at Pace University School of Law.
2. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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things. In trying to discharge that assignment, I decided several weeks ago that, as likely as any aspect of my experience
of about thirty-five years of environmental advocacy to add a
little to the relevant fund of learning, would be thoughts
about litigation and the adversary process in the development of environmental law.
I am deeply interested in that subject and do have some
definite views about it. It may be ironic that Lloyd Garrison
was, in law office parlance, much more of a trusts and estates
man than a litigator. That fact, I think, had much to do with
his contribution as a litigator of the founding environmental
law case. 3 Landmark cases in many fields of law have been
fashioned by practitioners who can approach the issues with
new and different perspectives from those of specialists in the
particular fields. Without any criticism of the fine firm which
represented Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference before
Lloyd took the appeal, thank goodness he was not a utilities
lawyer!
I begin my serious discussion with a statement I made
which has been quoted in several environmental law and policy books, including the history of the Sierra Club Legal De4
fense Fund (SCLDF) by Tom Turner, entitled Wild by Law,
and Peter Borelli's Environmental Prioritiesfor the Future:5
"In no other political and social movement has litigation
played such an important and dominant role [as in the environmental movement]." 6 It is one of those points that delights its maker, because nobody can really disprove it; hence
the maker becomes an authority. Perhaps trying to prove it
is equally fruitless, but that is precisely what I now want to
do.
In addition to trying to prove what I have said, I want,
assuming that my first point is correct, to go to the next question: is that good or bad? The latter question may seem
hardly a question at all in these days of the lowest public esteem for lawyers and courts, but I assume that even the lay
3. Id.
4. Frederic P. Sutherland, Preface to TOM
5.

6.

TURNER, WILD BY LAW (1990).
PETER BORELLI, ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE (1988).
TURNER, supra note 4, at xiii; see also BoRELLi, supra note 5, at 58.
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public will not rest its opinions of lawyers and litigation
wholly on the Los Angeles comic opera without 7music that
dominated the media throughout 1994 and 1995.
Let us start with a definition of "litigation." By the term,
I mean the adversary process. What is the "adversary process?" To answer that question I always refer to a law review
article by Judge Henry Friendly entitled Some Kind of Hearing,8 written mainly in the context of procedural due process
cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly. 9 Judge Friendly analyzed
administrative "hearings" to determine what would satisfy
procedural due process.
I do not want to discuss here the constitutional question.
I refer to the Friendly article to note the eleven procedural
aspects,' 0 which he considered in his discussion of the "Elements of a Fair Hearing." The statement of the eleven asCal. 3d __ (Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 1995).
8. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975).
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process in welfare termination proceedings required notice and the opportunity to confront and crossexamine witnesses). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that disability benefits could be terminated without a prior evidentiary
hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment requires an informal hearing before an inmate is denied parole); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532 (1985) (holding that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing prior
to the deprivation of any significant property interest); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrruTIONAL LAw 663-768 (2d ed. 1988).
10. The aspects are:
(1) An Unbiased Tribunal;
(2) Notice of the Proposed Action and the Grounds Asserted for It;
(3) An Opportunity to Present Reasons Why the Proposed Action
Should Not Be Taken;
(4) The Right to Call Witnesses;
(5) The Right to Know the Evidence Against One;
(6) The Right to Have Decision Based Only on the Evidence
Presented;
(7) Counsel;
(8) The Making of a Record;
(9) The Statement of Reasons;
(10) Public Attendance; and
(11) Judicial Review.
Friendly, supra note 8, at 1279-95.

7. People v. Simpson,
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pects constitutes an analysis and definition of the adversary
process. Judge Friendly concludes by stating that:
In the mass justice area the Supreme Court has yielded too
readily to the notions that the adversary system is the only
appropriate model and that there is only one acceptable solution to any problem, and consequently has been too
prone to indulge in constitutional codification. There is
need for experimentation, particularly for the use of the investigative model, for empirical studies, and for avoiding
absolutes.' 1
That a wholly adversary process is not constitutionally
required for an administrative hearing is demonstrated by a
line of cases beginning with Buttrey v.U.S.,12 holding that
the United States Army Corps of Engineers satisfied procedural due process in section 404 Clean Water Act proceedings. 13 The procedures were "paper hearing procedures, with
an informal face-to-face meeting,"' 4 not "trial-type procedures, with oral cross-examination of witnesses."' 5
Returning to the history of environmental law, beginning
with Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v. FederalPower

Comm'n (Scenic Hudson 1),16 the earliest group of important
cases were essentially judicial reviews of administrative actions, instituted by environmental advocates, under a statutory review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 17 Section 1 of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."' 8
11. Id. at 1316.
12. 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
14. Id. at 1183.
15. Id.
16. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
17. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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Based upon the standing doctrine of Scenic Hudson 1,19
and expanding upon that doctrine, the early cases 20 were
brought before the enactment of the first of the major federal
statutes comprising the body of modern federal environmen21
tal law, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
These and other cases were brought, and some were even determined, before the term "environmental law" came into
general use. Who first used this term, and exactly when it
was used, is probably unknown.
My first experience with the term "environmental law"
was in the fall of 1969, at a conference held by the Conservation Foundation and funded by the Ford Foundation in Airlee
House, Virginia. It was the first gathering of the then very
small number of attorneys who had participated in environmental cases. This group included Victor Yannocone, who

19. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
20. Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that local civic organizations and conservation groups
had standing to challenge a U.S. Dep't of Transportation-approved interstate
highway route); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1970) (holding that resident citizens group, national conservation group
and local village had standing to sue to enjoin the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from issuing a permit to dredge and fill the Hudson River for highway
construction); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) (holding that private citizens and conservation organizations had standing to bring suit to challenge the Transportation Secretary's authorization of
federal funding for a highway through a public park); Nashville 1-40 Steering
Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1968) (holding that local civic group members and residents could seek an injunction restraining state officials from constructing an interstate highway);
Izaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970)
(holding that a non-profit corporation with an aesthetic, conservational and recreational interest in protecting an area, could seek to enjoin a federal agency
from giving permission to defendants to extract minerals from that area);
Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 889 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs, local
residents and conservation organizations had standing to bring suit enjoining
the Forest Service from harvesting timber within a national forest contiguous
to a primitive wilderness area).
21. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214347 (1988).
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had brought an early DDT case 22 and founded the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and myself.
The conference was held just two months after the trial
court decision in the Hudson River Expressway case. 23 The
other two persons who comprised the litigation panel of the
conference were Professor Joseph Sax of Michigan Law
School, and Russell Brenneman, Esq. of New London, Connecticut, who had written a text on legal techniques to preserve natural areas. The conference participants were
mainly: (1) law school faculty who were teaching courses in
the context of Administrative Law and Natural Resources
Law and referring to Scenic Hudson124 and its new standing
and "relevant factors" doctrines; (2) some consumer and environmental activists, including Ralph Nader; and (3) officials
of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society and the
Izaak Walton League. Perhaps the principal product of the
conference, apart from publication of the proceedings and the
several papers presented, was the creation of the Environmental Law Institute and its Environmental Law Reporter.
We mark here and now the 25th anniversary of Earth
Day 1970. It was, as many of us remember and those
younger probably have learned, the explosive year of the environmental movement and of environmental law and policy.
I want to note some of the events of that year, and then relate
them to the early cases, and litigation in general. In addition
to the first Earth Day, 1970 witnessed:
25
A. The effective date, January 1, 1970, of NEPA;
B. The creation by NEPA of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)2 6 and its appointment of a Legal Advi22. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
23. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949
(1970).
24. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988). The CEQ, among other duties, reports to the
President at least once each year on the state and condition of the environment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1988).
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sory Committee (LAC), 27 whose membership included: Nick
Robinson; Joseph Sax; Professor Frank Grad of Columbia
Law School; Professor Louis Jaffe of Harvard Law School;
Whitney North Seymour Jr., the Committee's Chair; and
myself;
Air Act, with the first
C. The enactment of the Clean
28
provision;
suit
citizen
statutory
Order of the EnvironmenD. The creation by Executive
29
(EPA);
Agency
Protection
tal
E. The creation of the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC), Friends of the Earth and the Environmental Planning Lobby of New York State;
F. A rapid expansion of the number of law schools
teaching environmental law and the devotion of a number of
law school review issues to the new subject of environmental
law;
G. The beginnings of environmental law continuing
legal education programs;
H. A profusion of lawsuits under NEPA, beginning almost immediately after the January 1, 1970 date of its
30
effectiveness;
I. The first stirrings of, and popular use of the term,
"public interest law," an important aspect of which was the
environmental law of the early cases, responding to the public interest in environmental protection; and
J. The first reorganizations by states, including New
York, 31 of traditional conservation and fish and game departments into more broadly chartered environmental
departments.
27. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1970).
This report, announced on Apr. 30, advised the Council on a broad range of
environmental questions.
28. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. Exec. Order No. 11,472, 3 C.F.R. § 792 (1966-1970), reprinted in 3
U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
30. See, e.g., Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 430 F.2d
1315 (5th Cir. 1970). See also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
31. See 1970 N.Y. Laws 140.
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I am no sociologist or political theorist. It takes no such
expertise, however, to point out that the events of 1970 were
in no small measure owed to the drama, excitement and perhaps even the glamour of the early cases. The early cases,
including Scenic Hudson 1,32 were all David v. Goliath affairs,
brought by a few individuals, sometimes the activist lawyers
themselves, who took roads not generally taken until a fair
number of years later. The cases manifested and represented
the rebellion against the vested interests of the regulated
communities who, according to Justice William Douglas, in
his Points of Rebellion,3 3 and Professor Charles A. Reich, in
his The Greening of America,3 4 had virtually captured their
agency regulators.
One interesting aspect of the events of the late 1960s,
noted by Justice Douglas in commenting on the "captive" administrative agencies, and perhaps since forgotten by Dean
Ottinger, is the following:
The tragedies that are happening to our environment as a
result of agency actions are too numerous to list. They
reach into every State and mount in intensity as our resources diminish. People march and protest but they are
not heard. As a result, Congressman Richard L. Ottinger
of New York has recently proposed that a National Council
on the Environment be created and granted power to stay
impending agency action that may despoil the natural reinto the courts or
sources and to carry the controversy
35
before Congress, if necessary.
Dean Ottinger's proposal was both a precursor of NEPA and
a plan for expanding judicial review of environmental administrative actions.
In Professor Reich's book, which made him a virtual folk
hero of the young in 1970, he discussed the Scenic Hudson I

32.
33.
34.
35.

354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
JusTic. WiLLIAM DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1969).
CHARLEs A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
DOUGLAS, supra note 33, at 88.
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case3 6 as one of the early victories over the "established procedures" of various organs of government:
But these same "establishedprocedures," which seem so
impassable, may become a route to change if they are accompanied by even a partial change of consciousness.
Sometimes the liberals have succeeded by working through
structure. One example is in conservation. For a long
time, it appeared that no legal safeguards could accomplish much for conservation. The forces of "progress" were
just too powerful; the "lawful procedures" bent with the
prevailing forces. For example, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), with jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects
on rivers, was supposed to protect conservation values, but
normally ignored them. Thus, when Consolidated Edison
of New York applied to the FPC for approval of its plans to
construct a facility on the Hudson River near Storm King
Mountain, the FPC approved the facility, ignoring the
pleas of conservationists based on damage to aesthetic and
historical values. The conservationists appealed to the
courts; under established precedents they should have lost.
Instead,the CourtofAppeals reversed the FPC. It held that
the agency should have given greaterweight to conservation
values. The structureof the CorporateState gave way to a
degree, and an era ofgreaterlegal deference to conservation
7
began.3
The drama of litigation, even without the violence, sex
and race aspects of the case now receiving far wider attention
than has ever been accorded Marbury v. Madison,38 Brown v.
Board of Education,3 9 or Roe v. Wade,40 stems in large part
from its staged combat, battle-of-wits nature. 4 1 James M.
Landis, in his classic, The Administrative Process,42 refers to
"the issue of judicial review over administrative action giving
36. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
37. REICH, supra note 34, at 337-38 (emphasis added).
38. 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

39. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Cal.3d __ (Super. Ct. LA. Co. 1995).
41. People v. Simpson, 42. JAMEs M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
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one the sense of battle."43 Whatever the explanation, litigation can be as it was in the early 1970s: a powerful political
instrument in the evolution of all of the major environmental
legislation. By statutes and judge made law, "established
procedure[s] . . . be[came] a route to change." 44

Moreover, a principal aspect of the Environmental Movement and environmental law, on April 22, 1970 and for the
twenty-five years since - with present problems created by
Justice Scalia in the two Lujan cases 45 - has been the standing requirement of Article III of the Federal Constitution and
of certain "prudential" requirements for standing.4 6 An important aspect of the political debate has been the provision
for standing, dealt with in virtually every major federal environmental act in its citizen suit provision, beginning with sec47
tion 304 of the Clean Air Act of 1970.

More than any other factor, it is the standing of citizens
to sue based upon their representation of the public interest
in environmental protection first declared in Scenic Hudson
,48 rather than an economic or other traditional personal interest, that has rendered litigation more important in the development of environmental law than in other bodies of law.
I can prove this both empirically and analytically.
Empirically, I would first turn to the table of cases in any
case and materials book or text of environmental law, and
note the number of cases brought by the several major environmental public interest law firms (EPILF), whose charter
to litigate has been their standing in court. Taking William
Rodgers' Hornbook of Environmental Law49 as one example,
its Table of Cases lists fifty-five NRDC cases, forty-eight EDF
cases, seventy-nine Sierra Club cases (brought mainly by
43. Id. at 136.
44. REICH, supra note 34, at 337.
45. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
46. See Ass'n of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(holding that petitioners' standing to sue must be considered under the Cases
and Controversies Clause of Article III of the Constitution).
47. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
48. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
49. WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (1994).
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SCLDF), and eighteen National Wildlife Fund (NWF) cases. 50
It is also clear to any student or practitioner of environmental
law that the EPILF cases include a much higher proportion of
the leading cases than do those of other plaintiffs.
Add to those cases all of those brought by other individuals or organizations, including many ad hoc groups, the
standing of whom rested upon the statutory grant of citizen
standing, and one has at least two-thirds of all of the cases in
the Rodgers Table of Cases, 5 1 or in that of any other environmental law case book or treatise.
One may properly ask whether this proves that litigation
has been more important in the development of environmental law than in other bodies of law. Other bodies of law have
been developed in and by cases, regardless of the basis of the
standing of the plaintiffs. I do not have the means at this
time to check statistically other bodies of law (since I am only
now beginning, after several years' stubbornness born by
Wordsworth's preaching that, "[t]he world is too much with
us" 5 2 to embrace the computer world). I believe, however,
that such study is not necessary.
Consider the rapid pace at which important cases under
the early major environmental statutes arose! The rate at
which NEPA, for example, was made meaningful by litigation
was truly explosive. One can safely say that no other statute
has ever been effectuated by so many cases in so short a time.
In one early case based upon NEPA and filed on February 5,
1970, 5 3 in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of park
land for a golf course, a stay pending appeal was granted
under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
54
Procedure.
50. Id. at 909-27.
51. Id.
52. William Wordsworth, Miscellaneous Sonnet XXXIII, in THE POEMS OF
WORDSWORTH 259 (Thomas Hutchinson ed., 1926).
53. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 430 F.2d 1315
(5th Cir. 1970) (stay vacated for mootness).
54. FED. R. App. P. 8(a). After the lower court granted the stay in Texas
Comm., the plans were abandoned and the golf course was constructed on private land. The appeal to the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as moot because "the
judgment [would] spawn no legal consequences." 430 F.2d at 1315. See also
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The first and still greatest landmark NEPA case, Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n
(Calvert Cliffs), 55 was argued on April 16, 1971 and decided
on July 23, 1971. For the first time, a court was confronted
with "litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our
natural environment." 56 Here, the petitioners asserted that
the rules of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) failed to
satisfy the strict guidelines required under NEPA. In remanding the case, the D.C. Circuit held that a revision in the
AEC's rules was necessary in order to achieve NEPA's under57
lying intent.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,58
the plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the sale of oil and
gas leases. In granting the motion, the district court assessed
"the relative importance of the rights asserted and the acts
sought to be enjoined, the irreparable nature of the injury allegedly flowing from denial of preliminary relief, the
probability of ultimate success or failure of the suit [and] the
balancing of damages and conveniences generally."5 9 The
court of appeals affirmed, holding the probable environmental impact of issuing such a lease was too strong to warrant a
reversal. 60
In SierraClub v. Ruckelshaus,61 the court announced the
basic principle of non-degradation under the Clean Air Act of
United States v. Knippers and Day Real Estate, 425 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1970);
David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 649 (1970).
55. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
56. Id. at 1111.
57. Id. at 1129.
58. 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
59. Id. at 166 (quoting Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (1951)). See also
Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (plaintiff has the burden of proof
when seeking a preliminary injunction).
60. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). For
statistical information pertaining to NEPA cases ified from 1974 through 1990,
see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 142-43 (1992).
By June 30, 1975, approximately six years after the Clean Air Act was enacted,
332 cases were completed, 54 of which the court granted similar preliminary
injunctions. Id. Three hundred thirty-two cases were still pending at this time,
65 of which had motions to enjoin the defendant's activity. Id. at 143.
61. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
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The EPA Administrator was enjoined from approving
a state plan that would essentially degregate the existing
clean air quality because increasing pollution levels would
contradict the purpose of the Clean Air Act. 63 This decision
was affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals on November 1,
1972,64 and re-affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court
on June 11, 1973.65
One can turn to any of the other major environmental
acts and document the rapidity with which the laws were interpreted and effectuated by the cases, primarily brought by
public interest plaintiffs. Many other examples could be cited
of the virtually explosive rate at which the cases developed
environmental law in the 1970s. In A Retreat From Judicial
Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment,66 Professor Robert L. Glicksman describes and explains the rapid
expansion of environmental law in the 1970s as follows:
1970.62

The spate of federal environmental legislation enacted in
the late 1960's and early 1970's provided a fertile breeding
ground for litigation. The federal courts reacted to the resulting proliferationof lawsuits by aggressivelypromoting
the new, pro-environmental legislative objectives. They
lowered the barriers to private litigants' access to the federal courts, subjected administrative agencies to procedural requirements not always apparent on the face of
applicable legislation, interpreted environmental laws expansively and used common law to fill statutory gaps, and
engaged in rigorous review of the substantive merit of
weight
agency decisions which seemed to give insufficient
67
to legislatively sanctioned environmental values.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
63. 344 F. Supp. at 256. For an in depth discussion of the Clean Air Act of
1970, see S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1970).
64. 2 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656 (1972). The court affirmed and
held that to approve such a plan would allow the current air quality to drastically diminish. Id.
65. 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
66. Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from JudicialActivism: The Seventh
Circuitand the Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 209 (1987).
67. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). The main focus of this article is on the
passive role the courts have taken in implementing environmental laws.
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At a later point he states that, "[tihe roots of judicial activism in environmental litigation lay in social attitudes toward environmental problems prevailing among the
American public in the late 1960s."68 That judicial activism
was brought about by "[t]he relaxation of standing requirements for judicial review of agency actions involving environmental issues... [which] began when the courts held that a
plaintiff need not prove injury to a personal economic interest
to satisfy the 'case' or 'controversy' requirement of Article III
of the Constitution."69 My additional point is that the early
cases and judicial activism brought about the social activism,
as never before in the development of any other body of public
law, fully as much as the converse. Which was the hen and
which the egg is unimportant.
At the "roots of judicial activism in environmental litigation,"70 described by Glicksman, were NRDC et al. How and
why was such a uniquely important role in the development
of environmental law, by litigation, played by them? Consider first the mission of NRDC, born out of the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference; of EDF, born out of the DDT
controversy and Rachel Carson's Silent Spring;7 1 and of
SCLDF, born out of the Grand Canyon Dams controversy and
the resultant withdrawal of the tax deductibility of contributions to the Sierra Club itself. The raison d'etre of each was
the development of the law, not the advancement of the personal interests of the individuals whom they represented or
upon whose membership they rested their clients' standing.
These public interest environmental groups had, of
course, to satisfy the standing requirements of: (1) a personal
stake of themselves, their members or of other plaintiffs in
any controversy which they chose to bring to court constituting the injury in fact; (2) the traceability of the injury to the
action challenged; (3) the redressability of the injury by the
relief sought; and (4) the inclusion of the interest they claim
was injured in the zone of interests of the statute which it
68. Id. at 214.
69. Id. at 219.
70. Id. at 214.
71. RACHEL CARSON,

SILENT SPRING

(1962).
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was claimed are violated.7 2 As long as these requirements
have been satisfied, however, these groups have had the
power to choose when and where to litigate.
Public interest groups have not been required to accept a
passive role, as does the ordinary attorney who responds to a
client. They have been their own clients or been in a position
to represent clients whose particular interests are in accordance with their mission. Moreover, they have been able to
choose the proceeding to bring on the basis of the sheer importance of the issues, the probability of success and a
number of other factors including, within certain limits, the
possible political consequences. All of this never existed
before in the development of any other body of law.
Subject to their overall financial means, the groups have
not been bound by the financial considerations with respect to
each particular action, as must the more traditional attorney.
They must operate within their general budgets and means
when choosing the types of and particular proceedings to
bring. These choices have been based in part upon the ability
to secure the greatest impact on the developing law without
being bogged down in long and expensive trials.
The ability of NRDC, EDF, and SCLDF to develop the
law under the major environmental statutes has been remarkable. Avoiding long trials and other factual hearings,
their major cases have generally been comparatively inexpensive. I emphasize the word "comparatively," because the issues of law as well as of fact may be multitudinous and
complex in any litigation. The fair value of the services of the
attorneys involved and their support staffs may be high, regardless of the nature of the issues, legal or factual or the
nature or structure of the proceedings.
It is nevertheless axiomatic that the litigation of issues of
law is far less expensive than that of issues of fact. In the
latter case the expenses of depositions, trials, and other factual hearings can rapidly accumulate, at the rate of several
72. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472-75 (1981) (holding that plaintiffs
did not have standing due to a lack of injury in fact).
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thousand dollars per day, to tens and hundreds of thousands.
Much of the important law has been developed in statutory
review proceedings before courts of appeal, 73 in which there
has been no fact finding, or in district court actions reviewing
informal agency action, in which the courts have been limited
to the administrative record. The groups' statutory review
practice, much of which consists of challenges to EPA regulations, has resulted in a vast body of law. This comparative
simplicity and inexpensiveness have appreciably accelerated
the pace at which the major statutes have been interpreted.
Another aspect of environmental litigation that has accelerated the development of the law (and thus increased substantially the extent to which the law, at any given point in
time, has been created by litigation) is the frequency of preliminary injunction motions. Many of the important cases
have been decisions on preliminary injunction motions or appeals therefrom. 74 Whether the injunctions were granted or
denied, the cases, an example of which was the Citizens
Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 75 proceeded to early
disposition. Early in environmental cases, the rule was established that the undertaking as security for a preliminary
injunction might be in a nominal amount because requiring a
bond in the usual amount would be tantamount to denying
76
standing to a plaintiff.

Still another feature of any consideration and appraisal
of the importance of litigation in the development of environmental law is that of the extent to which that body of law is
part of the common law. In this connection most of us are
77
familiar with the teaching of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
that there is no federal common law of water pollution. There
73. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic
Energy Conm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F.
Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1972).
75. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). In that case a preliminary injunction was
denied, but the defendants, pursuant to the Court of Appeals' request, agreed to
stay construction until after trial, expediting the proceedings. Id.
76. See Friends of the Earth v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
77. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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is, on the other hand, a federal common law which developed
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com78
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund).
As to contribution, under CERCLA, among potentially
responsible parties, for example, a specific list of factors to be
applied in what was, and still is, referred to as the "Gore
Amendment," was dropped in the final language of
§ 113(f)(1). The language could hardly vest more importance
and authority in the litigation process than it does. "In
resolving contribution claims" under § 113(f)(1), the court
"may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
79
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."
What is "equitable" and "appropriate" in tort law is stated in
section 433 (among other sections) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,8 0 and is also found in other sources of tort
8
law. 1
Much of the law of hazardous and toxic substances is tort
law. Many environmental law professors have in recent
years resumed or commenced teaching torts, and most of the
attorneys and judges involved in Superfund and toxic tort
cases have searched for, and if lucky found, their law school
notes on Rylands v. Fletcher.8 2 In doing so they have become
experts on liability without fault and legal causation as between joint tortfeasors.
A chapter of the law of torts, especially the common law
of nuisance, is also the subject of a significant portion of any
environmental law casebook or text. Rodgers, in his introduction to Chapter 2, entitled "Common Law and the Variations," states:
78. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) § 101-405, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See, e.g., CERCLA § 107 (addressing liability under the Act).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965).
81. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 49, at 764, 768-90; GNB Battery Technologies, Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615 (1995); Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Nat'l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (1992); In re Sterling Steel
Treating, Inc. v. Becker, 94 B.R. 924 (1989).
82. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1966), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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Environmental law as it is known today is an amalgam of
common law and statutory principles. The impact of technology on humans has contributed in no small way to doctrinal developments in nuisance, trespass, negligence and
83
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.

All of this leads me to return to the prior statement of
mine which I quoted at the outset: that litigation has been
more important in the development of environmental law
than in any other body of public law.8 4 I think that I have

demonstrated it. To do so is the simpler of the two tasks I
have assumed in order to merit the honor extended to me in
initiating this lecture series. The harder task is that of answering the question, "[ius it good or bad?" Is litigation and
the adversary process a good means of making law, both directly, through the very cases declaring the law, and indirectly, by influencing the political processes out of which the
legislation evolves?
In any attempt to answer the question, it is important
first to broaden and deepen it. The question of whether a considerably more important role for litigation is good or bad
may be posed generally, not simply in the field of environmental law. It necessarily involves fundamental aspects of
our system of government under our Constitution. Just as
war is too important for only the generals to manage, the
place of litigation in law making is far too important to be
addressed wholly or even primarily by litigators or other lawyers or law scholars. The wisdom needed is at least equally
that of political scientists, sociologists and historians.
Turning to a non-lawyer, De Tocqueville, perhaps still
the greatest scholar of the American democracy, it has been
clear since the year of his classical treatise8 5 that no nation in
the world vests as much power and importance in the judiciary and its processes as we do. The power begins with that of
the courts to invalidate legislation for its unconstitutionality.
De Tocqueville's study preceded by about a half century the
83.

RODGERS,

supra note 49, at 100 (citations omitted).

84. See supra note 5.

85.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

(1835).
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origin of the administrative process and of judicial review of
administrative action.8 6 Any abolition of such review, as distinguished from its expansion or restriction would be, if not
unconstitutional, a political impossibility.
Having rejected the scenario at one end of the spectrum,
namely that of any drastic limitation of the functions of the
judiciary, including that of judicial review of administrative
action, one must, on the other hand, accept the proposition
stated above: that lawyers, the adversary process and courts
in general are probably at their lowest level of public esteem
in the history of at least my lifetime. One must consider
some curbing of the adversary process in the development of
environmental law. Where between the two scenarios do we
search for wisdom?
The question involves: (1) attitudes toward "judicial activism" versus "strict construction;" and (2) appraisal of the
adversary process as one by which to seek sound answers to
issues of law and fact. Both matters should be considered in
view of some special aspects of environmental law making.
Let me first turn to judicial activism. In the 1980s, highlighted perhaps by the positions taken by then Chief Justice
Burger and others, there were strong warnings of the flooding
87
of the courts, particularly the federal courts, with lawsuits.
It was claimed that the result of this flooding was the courts'
determinations of many questions of economic and social policy.88 The danger of the flooding of the courts with such
problems was indeed one of the strongest arguments against
permitting citizen suits in the environmental field.
Judicial activism had been defended eloquently by D.C.
Court of Appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright, four years before
86. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first federal administrative agency in the United States, was created by Congress in 1887 as an
exercise of its Constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10301-10388 (1988)); JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10 (1938).
87. See, e.g., Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1982) (addressing how the federal courts were drowning in litigation); Warren E. Burger, Isn't
There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
88. Burger, supra note 87, at 275.
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his Calvert Cliffs opinion,8 9 in The Role of the Supreme Court
in a Democratic Society - JudicialActivism or Restraint?90
Speaking of courts' incapacity to legislate he stated:
But whatever one may think of the Court's attempts to
mitigate the effects of its institutional incapacities, what is
clear about these incapacities is that, where relevant, they
counsel deference to the legislature but do not require it.
Where the choice is between the Court struggling alone
with a social issue and the legislature dealing with it expertly, legislative action is to be preferred. All too often,
however, the practical choice has been between the Court
doing the job as best it can and no one doing it at all.
Faced with these alternatives, the Court must assume the

legislature'sresponsibility. If the legislature simply cannot
or does not act to correct an unconstitutional status quo,
the Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do
so. For "nature abhors a political vacuum as much as any
other kind," and if the legislatures do not live up to their
constitutional responsibilities, the Court must act to fill
the vacuum. 9 1
The points made by Judge Wright were addressed to the
constitutional lawmaking of the Warren Court. However,
they fit very well into the environmental lawmaking of the
early cases brought before NEPA was passed, as well as cases
brought under NEPA and the later major environmental statutes. Moreover, each of those statutes, particularly NEPA,
which has no citizen suit provision, had to be adjudicated,
since Congress did not intend NEPA to be such a "paper
92
tiger."
Judge Wright distinguished the activism of the Warren
Court from that of "The Nine Old Men"93 of the New Deal era,
as follows:
89. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-

90. J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society
JudicialActivism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968).
91. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
92. 449 F.2d at 1114.
93. Wright, supra note 90, at 2.

21

22

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

There is, however, an obvious difference between the two
Courts. The Nine Old Men were trying to halt a revolution
in the role of government as a social instrument, while the
Warren Court is obviously furthering that effort. Its most
significant pronouncements have decreed change in the
status quo, not its preservation. Rather than invalidate
legislative efforts at social progress, its decisions have ordered alternation of widespread and long accepted practices, including many which had not been legislatively
sanctioned in the first place. In Professor Berle's phrase,
the Warren9 4 Court has functioned as a "revolutionary
committee."
I have almost always distrusted warnings about judicial
activism and flooding of the courts, even though, to the extent
of my own environmental advocacy and contributions to the
growth of standing, I have felt some pangs of guilt over the
extension of standing in court from the environmental field to
cases such as those brought by fathers of Little Leaguers suing over decision-making on the ball fields.
My feeling has always been that the advocates of strict
construction and limited access to the courts have not really
been against courts' activism and the adversary process per
se, but are against them so long as the results advanced
causes which they did not favor, such as the civil liberties and
racial equality causes served by the Warren Court 95 and environmental protection. I believe that advocates of strict construction would have a different view if the courts could be
used, in part by judicial review of administrative actions, to
inhibit environmental regulation and other governmental actions which they have deemed undesirable.
My suspicion has been confirmed by some of the bills
passed by the House of Representatives and currently being
considered by the Senate, to implement the "Contract with

94. Id. (quoting A. BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER vii (1967)).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); United States v.
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/1

22

1995]

THE LITIGATION PROCESS

America" (Contract).96 Without going too deeply into detail,
it appears absolutely clear that the regulatory reform bills,
H.R. 102297 and H.R. 450,98 would, if they become law, open
the federal courts to floods of litigation far more onerous for
the courts to handle. In fact, these bills would be far more
effective in inhibiting, perhaps paralyzing, governmental action, than any which have stemmed from the opening up of
the courts, by Scenic Hudson 9 and the citizen suit statutes, 10 0 to environmental advocates.
I only wish that political commentator and satirist Russell Baker would write a column about how item 9 of the Contract, purportedly designed to "stem the endless tide of
litigation," 10 contradicts the "regulatory reform" of item 8.102
The former is the "loser pays," restrict-product-liability
item.' 0 3 The latter would add to major rule-making affecting
public health, public safety and the environment, as new relevant factors: (1) risk analysis and characterization; and (2)
cost/benefit analysis.' 0 4 H.R. 1022 adds those factors in stat96. REP. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
97. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This version of risk assessment legislation, which is known as the "Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act
of 1995," passed the House of Representatives on February 28, 1995. 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) introduced his
own version, known as the "Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995," in
the Senate on February 2, 1995. When this article went to press, the Dole bill
was still being considered by the Senate. See S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45.
98. H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This bill is known as the "Regulatory Transition Act of 1995," and would establish a moratorium on regulatory
rule-making actions. The bill, which is known as S. 219 in the Senate, had
passed both houses of Congress at the time this article went to press. 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45.
99. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
100. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304; Clean Water Act § 505.
101. GINGRICH, supra note 97, at 11. This Contract item has been codified as
the "Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995." H.R. 956, S. 565,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). At the time this article went to press, the bill had
passed both houses of Congress. 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 8, tbl. 9, at 45.
102. GINGRICH, supra note 97, at 18.
103. Id. at 145-48.
104. Id. at 131-35.
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utory language which renders the environmental assessment
05
process of NEPA a childishly simple one, by comparison.'
At a recent annual environmental law course in Washington, D.C., which I chair every February, I asked Representative David McIntosh (R-IN), who is the intellectual leader
of "regulatory reform" whether the reform under item 8
would work to increase the volume and complexity of litigation. His answer was that it might do so, but no more than
the "loser pays" legislation under item 9 would decrease
litigation.
Having pointed out, however, that the "regulatory reform" advocates now are willing to promote floods of litigation, it is only fair that I point out that the EPA General
Counsel, Jean Nelson, Esq., at the same February conference,
stated the dangers of new floods of litigation which would issue from "regulatory reform." Other environmental advocates have also pointed out the dangers of hamstringing
environmental regulation.
There are other aspects of the inconsistencies of both proenvironmental and anti-environmental advocates. Those inconsistencies may tend to render moot any effort to either
limit or expand the adversary process in the environmental,
or any other field of regulation, by any legislation. It is
highly improbable that enough political strength could ever
be assembled to move the law either way if the political force
for reform is limited to that of administrative law and political science professors, assuming that they could agree.
Assuming, however, that there is some movement possible, by the gradual process of influencing courts, the authors
of law review articles and other critical sources of the law, the
question still remains: how valuable is the adversary process
in environmental decision making? My view is that it is of
great importance, more so than in most other areas of public
and private law.
To support that view requires consideration of both the
administrative process and the judicial process. The first aspect involves the issues of whether the principal elements of
105. See H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. tits. I & 11 (1995).
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the adversary process, as stated by Judge Friendly, should be
used by environmental administrative agencies in their decision making. Since courts are necessarily employing the adversary process, the second aspect involves the question of
whether the availability, scope and depth of judicial review of
administrative action should be greater in the environmental
field than in most other substantive areas of public law.
Both considerations, to my mind, raise issues concerning
the proper function of scientific and other technical (including
economic) expertise. Such expertise and the delineation of its
role are, in my opinion, more important in environmental decision-making by administrative agencies and courts than in
other fields, for two reasons: (1) the issues of fact are generally issues of conclusions drawn from undisputed perceived
facts, rather than issues of perceived facts, as to whether one
person may be telling the truth and another deliberately or
simply erroneously not telling the truth; and (2) it is particularly important in the environmental field that scientific and
other expertise be distinguished - and doing so is often difficult line drawing - from value judgment.
I believe that cross-examining an expert on the specific
factual bases and logic of his or her conclusions is more likely
to be productive, either in affirming or disproving those conclusions, than in disproving the testimony of lay witnesses
testifying as to perceived facts. Others may disagree about
this, and certainly demonstrating that a witness is lying,
rather than simply stating an unsound opinion, is more fun
for the cross examiner. But I do not think that the latter really occurs very frequently, even when the cross examiner is
F. Lee Bailey or someone else with far greater cross-examination skills than those of merely competent trial attorneys
such as myself.
Moreover, whether the demeanor of a witness and other
aspects of a witness and his or her testimony indicate he or
she has been lying or telling the truth is generally regarded
as the particular province of a jury. Administrative proceedings never, and environmental civil court cases, except for
hazardous waste and toxic tort damages cases, hardly ever,
involve juries.
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Turning to the second aspect, that of technical expertise
in environmental proceedings, which often involved the fusion or confusion of expertise with value judgments, I believe
that no process comes close to that of direct examination and
cross-examination in drawing the correct line. My first experience with such value judgments in a case was in the second
round of the Scenic Hudson FPC proceedings, 10 6 when the
value of the unbroken river shoreline of Storm King Mountain had to be balanced against the need of an affluent society
for more power. Another example of such value judgments
would be in administrative or judicial review proceedings
under the Contract's "regulatory reform" provisions, which
would require EPA and other agencies to perform risk analysis and cost benefit analysis in their environmental decision07
making.
If, for example, a cost/benefit analysis is based upon the
valuation of life, as it must be in some cases, does it not clarify the issue to have that valuation exposed, dissected and
weighed under cross-examination of the analyst, whether in
the administrative or the judicial review process? In using
the illustration of valuation of life I am not speaking solely of
an expert who I thought might have valued life too little. The
cross-examination might as well demonstrate that life has
been valued too much to justify a particularly stringent regulation, considering the costs of the regulation.
The function and value of non-specialist judges in reviewing the conclusions of experts, of both the agencies themselves and of those upon whose opinions they rely, is
described by Court of Appeals Judge Patricia Wald, in a paper presented at the 1991 Bellagio Conference on U.S.U.S.S.R. Environmental Protection Institutions. 0 8 On the
subject of the function of "non-specialist judges," and the role
of the environmental public interest law firms, she says:
106. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comn'n, 453
F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
107. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
108. Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 19 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 519 (1992).
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Although some worry that nonspecialist judges cannot understand the arcane subject matter of environmental law,
for the most part judges have proven themselves capable of
mastering its essentials in the same degree as elected legislators and agency policy makers. In cases brought to
compel the federal or state government to act, trial courts
on occasion have exercised dramatic powers, stopping timber sales, immediately enjoining all disposal of wastes, or
barring the addition of new sewer hookups. Such rulings
have a significant effect on agency decision making, but in
the absence of such judicial exercises of power, it is difficult
to see how agencies can be controlled. Legislative oversight is too sporadic for such a task. Fortunately,judicial
oversight is possible because of the major environmentalorganizations that can go face to face with the government in
court. Ordinary citizens rarely have the resources to conduct such litigation because of the excessive time and
money that trials and appeals consume.1 0 9
If we accept the premise that scientific and other expertise, and the delineation of its use, are of particular importance in environmental administrative and judicial decision
making, we can conclude that the adversary process is thus
particularly useful.
The second aspect of the value of the adversary process,
especially in the realm of environmental administrative action, is the availability, scope, and depth of judicial review.
Turning to that subject, I confess a certain uneasiness, born
of the fact that I will be saying in much briefer form (for
which I am certain everyone is now thankful) what I stated in
a Columbia Law Review Article in April, 1970.110 I feel this
uneasiness because I do not really know whether, on the one
hand, I should credit myself with some degree of prophecy, or
whether, on the other hand, I am demonstrating that I have
no or few new ideas twenty-five years later.
Whichever deduction is correct, I would point out that
one of the grounds for my taking the position in 1970, that
the scope and depth of judicial review should be greater in
109. Id. at 545-46 (emphasis added).
110. Sive, supra note 54.
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the environmental field than in most others,"' applies to
some extent at this time. I say "to some extent" but would
say, "equally as much or even more," if some version of the
Contract's "regulatory reform" 1 12 becomes law. A court applies Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC (Chevron),1 13 directing
the acceptance by courts of any reasonable construction by an
agency of the statute administered by it. Issues in the review
of environmental decision-making are more frequently issues
of law or mixed issues of law and fact, and less frequently
wholly issues of fact, as compared to most other fields of public and private law. Subject to Chevron, determinations of is4
sues of law may be reviewed de novo."
Due to the relationship between environmental law and
the terms of the statutes declaring it, such as the clause in
NEPA which requires an environmental impact statement
(EIS) for all agency actions "significantlyaffecting the quality
of the human environment," 1 5 an issue of the application of
the once new statutory term may change from one of law to
one of fact. The relationship of the newness of a statutory
term to the question of whether a determination of its application is one of law or of fact is clearly seen from Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council." 6 The "respondents
maintain[ed] that the question for review center[ed] on the
legal meaning of the term 'significant'," 117 in connection with
their claim that there was a duty to supplement an environmental impact statement, because "new information suffice[d] to establish a 'significant' effect [upon the
environment]." 1 8 The Supreme Court responded that "[t]he
dispute.. . does not turn on the meaning of the term 'signifi111. Id. at 614.
112. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
113. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As to the current status of the law of this case, see
The Supreme Court, EPA and Chevron: The Uncertain Status of Deference to
Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127
(March 1995).
114. 467 U.S. at 842-43. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
116. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
117. Id. at 376.
118. Id.
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cant' or on an application of [a] legal standard to settled
facts." 119 Rather, the Court ruled, "resolution of this dispute
120
involves primarily issues of fact."
There is little doubt that in the early NEPA days, an issue as to the meaning and application of the word, "significantly," 12 1 in the determination of whether an impact
statement is required, would have been at least a mixed issue
of law and fact. The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations 122 set forth a definition of some complex1 23
ity, after several early cases ruled upon the meaning.
In connection with the newness of statutory concepts and
terms, consider the issues of law the courts will have to face
in reviewing administrative agency applications of any new
law requiring risk analysis and cost/benefit analysis. Examine, for instance, the problems of a court reviewing an
EPA strategy determination required to be based upon a cost/
benefit analysis. Perhaps, one valuing life and weighing it
against the costs of preventing death, with EPA being required to certify, among other things:
That other alternative strategies identified or considered
by the agency were found either: (A) to be less cost-effective at achieving a substantially equivalent reduction in
risk; or (B) to provide less flexibility to state, local, or tribal
governments or regulated entities in achieving the otherwise applicable objectives of the regulation along with a
brief explanation of why alternative strategies that were
identified or considered by the124agency were found to be less
cost-effective or less flexible.
119. Id. at 377.
120. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377.
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1994).
122. Id.
123. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973) (holding that in determining whether the erection of a jail, a
major federal action, will affect the quality of the environment, the review must
determine whether adverse environmental effects would exceed existing impacts); Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that Army Corps of Engineers must reconsider its assumption
that 17,300 acres to be cleared and converted from wetlands to agricultural use
would be cleared by landowners regardless of a flood control project).
124. See H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a)(3) (1995).
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The prospect of a regulated community advocate, perhaps even (to use a more strident term) a polluter,bringing a
judicial proceeding to review an EPA rule, in which the reviewing court would have to determine the meaning of the
above quoted, Gingrich inspired, paragraph, poses a dilemma
for me. On the one hand, the broader and deeper the court
review and the weaker the Chevron- inspired presumption of
reasonability of statutory interpretation accorded to EPA,
the worse it may be for the environmentalists. On the other
hand, I favor more intensive review in environmental cases.
In this connection it is reasonable to anticipate that such
judicial reviews would delay implementation of EPA regulations to the point of rendering permanent the moratorium
against EPA major rulemaking of another Contract inspired
"regulatory reform," H.R. 450.125 It might at least delay implementation many more years than I, by judicial review,
helped delay a case in which I represented communities opposing the 1-287 cutting away of whole mountainsides in the
12 6
Highlands of Passaic and Bergen counties of New Jersey.
Here is my second dilemma. Am I at this lecture more or
less of an administrative and environmental law teacher or
student than an environmental advocate? I think that my
role here is more the former, however difficult it is not to be
overwhelmed by a resurgence of youth, thinking back to the
fun days with Dick Ottinger spreading our environmental
gospel from his Volkswagen bus.
Imagining myself again as a member of the Administrative Conference of the United States, and discharging the
function I might thus discharge if the Contract 12 7 schedule
were slowed down to two hundred days, I continue to take the
position that broader and deeper judicial review of environmental administrative actions should be the rule. Such review is important enough to suffer the slowing down or
reversal of EPA rulemaking actions, as well as to delay the
125. See supra note 100.
126. County of Bergen v. Dole, 620 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 800
F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1986).
127. GINGRICH, supra note 96.
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implementation of mountainside cutting or of U.S. Forest
Service lumbering contracts.
There is still another reason, in my opinion, for more intensive review of environmental agency actions than of most
other agency actions. As described in my 1970 Columbia Law
Review effort, 128 there is legal authority for broadening and
deepening judicial review in cases where a claimant of a constitutional right came before an agency. A 1922 Supreme
Court opinion by Justice Brandeis, in a deportation case, so
held. 12 9 The reason was that the right to avoid deportation
130
was said to be "all that makes life worth living."
Environmental rights may not always be quite in the
same category. However, if the scope and depth of judicial
review are even roughly proportionate to the relative irrevocability and importance of administrative determinations to
be judicially reviewed, environmental determinations frequently meet the test. This may have been more the case in
the earlier years when the cases, more frequently than today,
13 1
involved projects to be built or not built, e.g., power plants,
massive dams, 13 2 or interstate roads. 13 3 It still is the case,
however, that environmental decisions are generally less revocable than those in other fields of law. If, for example, the
"regulatory reform" of item 8 of the Contract13 4 becomes law,
the cost of death and the benefit of life will be appraised in
the consideration of the cost-effectiveness of each new regula128. Sive, supra note 54.
129. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
130. Id. at 284.
131. See supra notes 1-2, 107 and accompanying text.
132. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding
that the Endangered Species Act prohibited the completion of a dam which
would have either eradicated a known population of an endangered species, the
snail darter, or destroyed its critical habitat).
133. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) (holding that the Secretary of Transportation may not authorize funds
for construction of a highway through a public park if a "feasible and prudent"
alternative route exists; and if no such route exists, construction may only be
approved if there has been "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the
park).
134. GINGRINCH, supra note 96, at 18.

31

32

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

tion. 135 The administrative decisions may well involve for
some affected persons little short of "all that makes life worth
living" for a candidate for deportation. 136 Stated otherwise,
and with some admitted triteness and sentimentality, excusable on this anniversary day: "There is only one Earth."

135. Id. at 132.
136. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. at 284 (1922).
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